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MACAULAY, MACNEIL, AND THE DISCOVERY OF
SOLIDARITY AND POWER IN CONTRACT LAW
ROBERT W. GORDON*
Professor Gordon's Comment focuses on the substantial departures of Stewart
Macaulay and Ian Macneil from the conventions of traditional contracts scholarship.
He argues that the Macaulay-Macneil perspectives, different though they are, have
challenged mainstream scholars in three ways: (I) in emphasizing continuing
relations within a community rather than discrete transactions between autonomous
individuals; (2) in recognizing the pervasiveness of coercion and dependence in
nominally free marketplace relationships; and (3) in demonstrating the practical
marginality of the legal rules comprising the core of most conventional scholarship.
Professor Gordon concludes by outlining the dramatic changes that would be
required in mainstream scholarship were the insights of Macaulay and Macneil to be
taken seriously.
It is extremely pleasant to be handed the task of commenting on a
paper by Ian Macneil at a conference called in appreciation of the work
of Stewart Macaulay. The occasion seems a good one on which to spec-
ulate upon-and simply to celebrate-the contribution that these two
extraordinary Scotsmen have made to contracts scholarship in our
time.
That contribution-the development of a "relational" perspective
on contracting-has been, I believe, fundamental, in the literal sense of
altering the foundations of the subject. You would never know this,
unfortunately, from reading ordinary contracts scholarship, which the
work of Macneil and Macaulay, as contrasted to law-and-economics,
has as yet scarcely dented. That is not an accident. Most law-and-eco-
nomics scholarship emerged from the "transactional" models of ex-
change and the highly individualist ideological assumptions central to
straight common law doctrinal scholarship, and so has been readily as-
similated to that scholarship. The "relational" view poses a much more
radical set of challenges: contracts scholars who took it seriously would
really have to change their thinking about the field. Let me try to ex-
plain why.
One way of looking at Macneil-Macaulay "relationalism"-to
compress for the moment into a single slogan the approaches of these
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. Ian Macneil commented helpfully on a draft of
this Comment.
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two quite different thinkers-is as the continuation of two scholarly
projects embraced, but then prematurely abandoned, by the Legal
Realists of the 1920s and 1930s. One of those projects was chiefly de-
structive, the other constructive. Let's call the destructive project "cri-
tique, through contextualization, of classical-formalist contract law"
and the other, "reconstruction, also through contextualization, of the
actual operating norms and conventions of contracting."
(1) The project of critique was, of course, to take apart the magnifi-
cent doctrinal Crystal Palace that Langdell, Anson, Pollock, and Willis-
ton had built; the favored critical technique was to examine how courts
actually operated the classical rules in different fact-situations stated in
decided contracts cases. The result was a vast body of contracts schol-
arship, reaching its Summa in Corbin's great treatise, showing how
rules framed in abstract general terms ("performance of a pre-existing
duty is not consideration sufficient to support a promise") could lead, as
actually applied, to quite opposite results in different settings.1
(2) The other project was to try to build a new contract law on the
ruins of the old, a law that would be more solidly founded on the empir-
ical regularities observed in the decided cases, and that would make
articulate their hitherto unstated but implicit bases in ethics, policy, and
social function. The result was a body of distinguished work (the roll-
call of soldiers in this cause includes the names of Corbin, Llewellyn,
Kessler, Patterson, Fuller, and Dawson among many others) showing
that contextual considerations-such as the severity of the fault of the
breaching party, the relative good faith of the parties, their relative so-
phistication or bargaining power, the degree of their detrimental reli-
ance upon one another, the harshness of contract terms or the tiny stan-
dard-form type in which such terms appeared-both did and should
1. Given this large body of work, I am always a bit taken aback to hear lawyers argue,
as they sometimes do, that for all its faults the old formal-classical system of rules had the virtues
of predictability and administrative convenience; its results might be sometimes arbitrary or unjust
but at least one knew where one stood. I should have thought if there was one proof the Realists
critics had managed to nail down for good it was that of the manipulability and contextual varia-
bility of the old rule-system. If the rules are stable and predictable in particular practice settings-
as of course they usually are, at least in the short-to-medium term-that stability derives from
well-accepted conventions within the community of regular interpreters of the rule. Parties with a
stake in upsetting the established interpretations, however, may (and often do) throw out new
arguments that faithful adherence to the stabilizing conventions would defeat the larger purposes
or policies behind the rule. When these arguments are made, and it suddenly becomes clear that the
rule can be plausibly interpreted in different ways, the usual response of legal decision-makers is
the same as that of the Realists: i.e., to attempt a rough classification of contexts where the conven-
tion will and will not apply. ("In sales to consumers via standardized forms, the parol evidence rule
will almost never be successfully invoked to bar evidence of oral sales warranties.") New conven-
tions may then stabilize around the new classification.
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influence judicial decisions whether contracts had been formed, modi-
fied, breached, or excused, and what remedies should be given.
This kind of work, radically disruptive though it undoubtedly once
was (it has since become the normal-science staple crop of the contracts
field), was quite modest in its methods: it stuck to appellate contracts
cases, and drew its contextual data from the facts as related in those
cases. Some of the Realists had been more ambitious about the recon-
structive project: they planned to go beyond the cases to discover what
the relation was between legal and social norms, and, if there were dis-
parities between the two, to use the social norms (e.g., the best commer-
cial customs) as the basis for reforming the legal ones.2 For various
reasons-resistance of traditional lawyers, frustration with the diffi-
culty and inconclusiveness of empirical research, diversion into New
Deal politics, inability to theorize beyond naive functionalism or
behavioralism about law-society relations3 -the Realists never took
these ambitions very far off the ground. Some of their successors
bravely struggled onwards, producing remarkable work that was al-
most completely ignored in mainstream scholarship. Dawson studied
contract decisions in periods of high inflation in the United States and
Germany." Kessler looked closely at auto dealer franchises as an in-
stance of contract relationships within a vertically-integrated industry.5
Hurst and Friedman studied hundreds of contracts cases in the histori-
cal context of a developing Wisconsin society and economy.6 A few
scholars, notably Reitz and Speidel, carried on the project of relating
legal decisions, and evaluating them by their functional contribution to
particular commercial contexts.7 Danzig thoroughly researched the
background of some well-known contracts cases, locating the appellate
decisions within great tangled complexes of emotional, social, and eco-
nomic purposes as well as the labyrinths of legal bureaucracies and pro-
2. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 2; see also Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975); Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and
Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, II VIL. L. REv. 213
(1966).
3. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of
Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 195 (1980), Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical
Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459 (1979).
4. Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L.
REv. 171 (1934); Dawson & Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: United States,
1861-1879, 33 MICH. L. REv. 706 (1935).
5. Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957).
6. J. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 285-423 (1964); L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT
LAW IN AMERICA (1965).
7. Reitz, Construction Lenders' Liability to Contractors, Subcontractors, and Material-
men, 130 U. PA. L, REv. 416 (1981); Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term
Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 369 (1982).
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fessional strategies.' Whitford produced seminal studies of consumer
protection law, fully situated in regulatory and social contexts.9 There
were a few empirical studies of contracting practices in specialized
trades which were very useful but modestly refrained from trying to
generalize from their conclusions. Within the vast ocean of common
law contracts scholarship, these social-contextual studies made up a
forlorn and isolated archipelago. After 1970, the main tendencies of
new work on contracts turned away from Realist contextualism alto-
gether. In their efforts to reconstruct what looks remarkably like the old
formal-classical rule-system (with some pieces missing, such as the
"consideration" doctrine or the policy against stipulated penalties) on
the basis of economic efficiency or Kantian moral autonomy, both the
law-and-economics and contract-as-promise scholars' 0 stuck mostly to
the appellate cases, and used them not as the Realist tradition had, as
rich storehouses of contextual data, but largely as statements of rules,
and rather barebones statements at that.
Macaulay and Macneil paid no attention to these trends, and went
their own way. Their way, as it turned out, lay in the close inspection of
the norms and practices of the commercial users of contract law, the
contracting parties themselves. Supplementing their own observations
of contracting practices with materials from anthropology and sociol-
ogy, they painted a stunning series of real-world contractual land-
scapes. The shock value of this work, as so often with the best of the
avant-garde, lay partly in its dramatic announcement of underground
truths in public-perceptions widely shared by business people and
their lawyers, but never before" given utterance in the polite society of
formal discourse about law. As I see it, the new work challenged the
salon jurists of the old establishment in three fundamental ways.
1. Organic Solidarity. Classical contract law, like classical political
economy, assumed a social world populated by self-constituting, self-
reliant subjects, each pursuing his individual projects, and viewing
other people either as threats or as means to realizing those projects. A
contract represented one of the carefully circumscribed occasional in-
teractions that joined some of these isolated beings together for an
8. R. DANZIG, Tim CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW (1978).
9. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile War-
ranty, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1006; Grau & Whitford, The Impact of Judicializing Repossession: The
Wisconsin Consumer Act Revisited, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 983.
10. I have in mind here chiefly the Posner-Landes school of law-and-economics and the
work of Charles Fried. There is of course an important exception in the work of the "transaction-
costs" economists led by Oliver Williamson and Victor Goldberg, work that draws heavily upon
the insights of Macaulay and Macneil.
11. Not quite "never." See, e.g., Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay In Perspec-
tive, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931).
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alienated moment of mutual exploitation. 2 This Hobbesian individu-
alism is not at all the only mode even of classical contract law, as
Duncan Kennedy has shown,"3 but it is the dominant mode of that law
and of the modem economism that now seeks to resurrect it.
What Macneil and Macaulay brought to surface awareness was
that the images of classical contract law described at best a small and
residual body of contract dealings: "discrete transactions" (in
Macneil's phrase) between strangers. The common type of commercial
exchange was among participants in continuing relations, members of
interactive communities whose projects themselves, as well as expecta-
tions about how they will be carried out, are partially created by the
community. In classical contract, individuals have no obligations to
each other save those created by the coercive rules of the state or their
own promises:' 4 if contract law outcomes are therefore to be rational-
ized on the preferred grounds of consent rather than those of public
policy, the outcomes must appear to flow from the parties' promises,
from their ex ante allocations of performance obligations and risks, or
at least from a plausible implication (or transaction-cost-saving legal
approximation) of such promises. In the "relational" view of Macaulay
and Macneil, parties treat their contracts more like marriages than like
one-night stands. Obligations grow out of the commitment that they
have made to one another, and the conventions that the trading com-
munity establishes for such commitments; they are not frozen at the
initial moment of commitment, but change as circumstances change;
the object of contracting is not primarily to allocate risks, but to signify
a commitment to cooperate. In bad times parties are expected to lend
one another mutual support, rather than standing on their rights; each
will treat the other's insistence on literal performance as willful obstruc-
tionism; if unexpected contingencies occur resulting in severe losses, the
parties are to search for equitable ways of dividing the losses; and the
sanction for egregiously bad behavior, is always, of course, refusal to
deal again.
12. Gabel, Intention and Structure In Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for
Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977).
13. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685
(1976).
14. Again, this is a caricature even of the 19th century rule-system. It leaves out of ac-
count the entire, very extensive realm of legally recognized and enforced fiduciary relationships, as
well as the many occasions on which contracts courts paternalistically protected weak parties from
bad bargains. The caricature also ignores what Victorian lawyers took for granted as the back-
ground they were legislating against: a body of powerful non-legal social codes and sanctions.
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The work of Macaulay and Macneil thus picks up a recurrent if
usually muted contrapuntal theme in liberal social science: 5 that cer-
tain kinds of cultural-social understandings and institutions, to main-
tain them, have been important conditions of the successful operation
of capitalist economies. To put it another way, expectations of mutual
advantage (narrowly conceived), reinforced only by coercive state en-
forcement of property-and-contract rights, fashion insufficiently dura-
ble bonds to induce cooperative social action on any large scale. Some-
thing else must be at work to create the foundations of mutual trust and
solidarity upon which economic planning depends. Macneil's work in
particular is close to Durkheim's in its emphasis upon the norms of
solidarity and reciprocity, "organic solidarity," that can emerge from
continuing relations.1 6 I don't mean to trivialize their achievement by
trying thus to pigeon-hole it in the social science tradition. It is one
thing to have an insight at this general level of abstraction; it is another
thing to have thoroughly analyzed, as Macneil and Macaulay have
done, the particular ways in which the insight is played out in actual
economic relations.
2. Domination. Classical contract law solves the Hobbesian prob-
lem of power by trying to give the parties only the most circumscribed
rights in one another's future conduct: rights bargained for through
formally specified contracting procedures. In the messy and open-ended
world of continuing contract relations, where the contours of obliga-
tion are constantly shifting, the effects of power imbalances are not lim-
ited to the concessions that parties can extort in the original bargain.
Such imbalances tend to generate hierarchies that can gradually extend
to govern every aspect of the relation in performance. This is the poten-
tial dark side of continuing contract relations, as organic solidarity is
the bright side: what starts out as a mere inequity in market power can
be deepened into persistent domination on one side and dependence on
the other. This is not slavery, since the parties are legally free to exit; but
the whole perspective of relational contract suggests that sunk costs can
matter tremendously, that the trauma of abandoning a relationship
around which a company has structured all its operations, hiring, in-
vestment, and planning decisions, can keep it tied into a dependence
that its members experience as all the more corrupting because it is in
some sense voluntary.
15. The locus classicus for this theme is in the work of another child of the Scottish
Enlightenment, A. SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759), the other face of the founder
of classical political economy.
16. See generally E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1964).
HeinOnline -- 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 570 1985
Solidarity and Power in Contract Law
Modern contracts scholars tend to see such relations of domina-
tion as aberrational situations, which, for good or evil (depending on
whether one is liberally or conservatively inclined) contract law has
evolved various curative doctrines to police. In other words, there is not
that much of a problem, and contract law can take care of what prob-
lem there is. Macaulay and Macneil, like the Critical Legal Studies
scholars, follow the lead of the more unsparingly cold-eyed Realists
such as Hale, Kessler, and Dawson, 7 who find coercion and domina-
tion to be pervasive in market relations. Their reactions to this knowl-
edge differ somewhat. Macaulay's reaction (which I feel more confident
that I can describe than I do Macneil's)1 8 is to assimilate continuing
contract relations to a general conception of political struggle. In
Macaulay's view, contract parties-such as the automobile manufac-
turers and their suppliers or dealers, or the oil companies and gas-sta-
tion franchisees-appear both as social groups locked into relations of
hierarchy and as political interest-groups trying strategically to manip-
ulate outside institutions (including courts) to improve their basic bar-
gaining positions. On the whole, Macaulay is a depressed liberal; he
wishes that the weaker parties to these relationships could transform
them into more egalitarian ones, but is very pessimistic about their abil-
ity to do so, because he believes that most of the institutional structures
through which the struggle is carried on tend to work to the advantage
of wealth and power. 9 (More on this issue in a moment.)
3. Discontinuity and Marginality of "Contract Law. "All their other
challenges to standard contracts work might have been forgiveable, if
Macneil and Macaulay had not implacably insisted upon demonstrat-
ing, over and over again, the relative insignificance for contracts-in-ac-
tion of the traditional materials of legal scholarship, the decisions of
common law contracts courts. This demonstration has two aspects:
(a) The marginality of state-enforced norms and sanctions in the
governance of contract relations. This was of course the theme of
Macaulay's famous 1963 article which described businessmen who did
not rely on legal norms to define or sanctions to enforce their relations
because they had their own, more effective, norms and sanctions.2 °
17. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943);
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV.
629 (1943); Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay In Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253 (1945).
18. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for
A "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1018 (1981).
19. S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS: THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTUR-
ERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966); Macaulay, Private Government, in HANDBOOK OF LAW & SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1985) (forthcoming).
20. Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
REv. 55 (1963).
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Macneil's approach has been somewhat different. It has been to con-
trast the detailed normative premises in traditional contract law with
those emerging from relational contracting, and show that despite lim-
ited concessions to relationalism, modern contract law remains wedded
to unrealistic models of the discrete transaction.2 Both men picture
contract law and its enforcement as a world removed from, and only
indirectly related to, the normal expectations of contracting parties (ex-
cept in one-shot high-risk transactions between strangers where the
Hobbesian assumptions of contract law may become the practical real-
ism of the situation). Macaulay in particular pictures the occasional
resort by private parties to formal legal sanctions as mostly opportunis-
tic and tactical: by going to law, the parties are not appealing to shared
values embodied in legal rules, or seeking moral vindication of their
position or a just settlement of their disputes; they are usually engaged
in maneuvers to improve their bargaining positions. The "law", to such
parties, its norms, rules, procedures, costs, etc., appears in a completely
alienated form as a set of games, strategies and hurdles.22 From this
point of view, the only thing that matters about a legal form is whether
it can help give one leverage or slow the other side down. Parties with a
lot of resources, for example, do not mind general equitable standards
even if the substance of such standards cuts against them because they
cannot practically be enforced without a lot of expensive evidence. Such
parties also like nice points of law-jurisdictional objections, conflicts-
of-laws issues, and the like-because their lawyers are likely to be more
practiced in arguing them than are the opposition's." Macaulay's
point, I should stress, ought not be confused with the economist's re-
duction of all human choice to "rational" maximizing behavior.
Macaulay doesn't believe contracting parties think like Holmesian
"bad men" about all norms, and certainly not the norms of their inter-
est group or relational-contract community; but they often do think
like "bad men" with respect to specifically legal rules and procedures.
Macaulay's businessmen may be seen as inhabiting overlapping and to
some extent mutually contradicting moral universes of contracting
rules, one of which (their private order) supplies the norms that they
actually internalize, the other (the legal order) furnishing an arsenal of
21. See generally I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL, CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
22. Ted Schneyer pointed out to me at the symposium how Macaulay's account of the
way law looks to contract parties resembles Erving Goffman's accounts of ordinary social interac-
tions as games-strategic manipulations of conventional forms.
23. Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract
[hereinafter cited as Elegant Models], 11 L. & Soc'Y REV. 507 (1977); cf. Galanter, Why The
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95
(1974).
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strategic weapons in case the relation breaks down. His work reveals,
then, a radical discontinuity between official ways of thinking about
law, as a repository of values and sanctions controlling social behavior,
and the expectations of the inhabitants of the "semi-autonomous social
fields" (in Sally Moore's phrase) that the law is supposed to affect. Even
more interesting and disturbing, it reveals that quite often the profes-
sionals of the legal system themselves adopt the outsiders' rather than
the official view: Macaulay shows lawyers, and even sometimes judges,
accepting the chilling and amoral vision of the law as nothing but a
storehouse of bargaining chips.2 4
(b) The marginality of the common law of contract within the
body of state-enforced norms and sanctions. Macneil and Macaulay go
well beyond the familiar point that general contract law has fallen from
its nineteenth century primacy in the governance of private ordering to
the relatively trivial status of a body of law employed to fill in the inter-
stices left by the big new systems of specialized legislative and adminis-
trative regulation. Macneil points out that from the relational perspec-
tive, any body of law that helps to structure contracting behavior ought
to be considered as part of contract law: this would include corporation
law and labor law, for example. Macaulay's view of contract relations
as periodic political conflict, sees common law contract courts as simply
one among the many institutional battlegrounds on which the parties
carry on their struggle. The perspectives of both men suggest that even
those who think legal scholarship should be confined to the study of
state-enforced norms, are not looking at enough of the contract law
that matters if they stick to' the common law (and UCC) alone.25
Now perhaps it will be clear why, if contracts scholars were to take
seriously the challenges posed by Macneil and Macaulay, they would
have to write very differently about their subject. Contracts scholarship
rests upon the essentially liberal premise that the terms of social interac-
tion ought to be, and in our society mostly are, instituted by consent-
either the actual voluntary choices of the parties, or by means of state
rules enacted and enforced by their constitutionally chosen representa-
tives. Liberals on the right want most terms to be of the former kind,
liberals on the left are more favorable to the latter kind; but they both
share this notion that social life is, both ideally and (almost) in practice,
the product of voluntary individual choice. If there is coercion, it
should be defended as necessary to police deviations from consensually
24. Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 L. & Soc'y REV. 115 (1979);
Macaulay, Elegant Models, supra note 23.
25. For an effective early statement of this point, see Summers, Collective Agreements
and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969).
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fixed terms, or else as an unfortunate but necessary minimum of control
that people in any society would have to endure.
With their discovery of relational contract-in-action, Macneil and
Macaulay imported a new element into contracts discourse, the element
of society, which cannot be accounted for entirely as the product of
individual or constitutional-democratic-state choices, but which exists
in some respects prior to such choices, and which helps to condition
both what is chosen and the structures within which choices are played
out. To express this in another way, their work shows how economic
purposes and actions are deeply embedded in social fields, in densely
woven webs of local customs, conventional morals, bonds of loyalty
and entrenched power hierarchies. Of course, nobody could claim that
Macneil and Macaulay discovered contracting societies. Mainstream
contract law, especially in its post-Realist forms, repeatedly recognizes
the existence of social background conditions to contracting. For ex-
ample, consider the "course of dealing, course of performance, and us-
age of trade" or the "commercial reasonableness" that may be con-
sulted as supplementary guides to contractual intent, or the sometimes
pervasive inequalities between parties in information, bargaining skill,
or market alternatives that make up what the courts like to call "une-
qual bargaining power." But in mainstream contract law, such condi-
tions only occupy the background; they are what will govern the trans-
action only until the parties or the state choose otherwise; they are
canvases which individual intent or state policy may paint over at dis-
cretion. Macneil's and Macaulay's accomplishment has been to bring
contracting societies into the foreground, and by so doing to show that
you cannot even begin to understand contractual expectations without
understanding the social conditions of their generation, change, and
termination. Moreover, they demonstrate that such conditions are not
supplementary, but primary, sources of contracting norms and sanc-
tions. Finally, not only are those social conditions not readily trumped
by the state-enforced norms and sanctions of contract law, but they are
often simply not affected by contract law at all.
I want to make clear that I am not attributing to Macneil and
Macaulay a kind of conservative Burkean organicism, some notion that
contracting societies arise spontaneously and reproduce mysteriously,
resistant alike to rational understanding and deliberate alteration. On
the contrary, they can be understood, and Macneil and Macaulay have
gone a long way toward understanding them. They are built with
human intentions and purposes, and can be changed, like any other
social arrangements, through politics, including but not at all limited to
politics whose strategy is to make use of the instrumentalities of the
state and legal system. As Macaulay has shown, however, any group
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that tries to change the social structure of contract relations through
political struggle must be prepared for a lot of frustration and unex-
pected consequences.
If contracts scholars were to accept the relational revolution, and
shift their focus accordingly, what would be the fate of the traditional
materials of contracts-the common law and UCC cases and the com-
mentaries on them? At some moments in their work both Macneil and
Macaulay have seemed to say that the relational perspective reveals
that traditional contracts materials are an academic museum of quaint
curiosities, a law of law professors bearing but slight resemblance to the
law-in-action known to contracting parties and their lawyers. In this
view the marginality and discontinuity of mainstream contracts results
from nothing more significant than an academic deformation profes-
sionelle, the narrow parochialism of the case-law tradition persisting
through sheer inertia. Clearly there is something to this; but it is not the
whole story, as Macneil and Macaulay have also recognized on other
occasions.2 6 As I have been arguing in this Comment, the relational
perspective's revelation of a social world of semi-autonomous con-
tracting cultures, governed by relations of cooperative organic solidar-
ity and of pervasive hierarchical domination, is deeply upsetting to the
core premises of our liberal social order. Contract law has traditionally
been one of the theatres-a small, elite theatre, to be sure, compared to
television or Chamber of Commerce lunches-in which those premises
are given public expression. Contract law has, arguably, been filled with
ideological purposes; and the manner in which it suppresses or relegates
to the background conditions of the social element in contracting have
not been just incidental consequences of professional parochialism, but
important to its vindication of those purposes.27
26. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 340 (1983);
Macaulay, Elegant Models, supra note 23.
27. I do not mean to suggest here that it would be impossible for a liberal theory of
contracts to swallow the insights of relationalism without being turned on its head, i.e., that liber-
alism to save its integrity must deny the pervasiveness of organic solidarity and hierarchy in civil
society. On the contrary. The "transaction-cost" economics of Oliver Williamson and his school
represents exactly such an assimilation of "relational" insights to the liberal model of social rela-
tions as the products of rational individual choices: solidarity and hierarchy are explained as
institutional governance forms chosen for the purpose of realizing efficiency gains. See, e.g.,
Williamson, The Organization of Work: A Comparative Institutional Assessment, I J. ECON.
BEHAv. & ORG. 5 (1980); Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J. LAW AND ECON. 233 (1979). The work of this school is exciting and extremely rich
in insights; for instance, consult Victor Goldberg and Thomas Palay's contributions to this Sym-
posium. But the price of this school's success in its project of assimilation is its exclusion from its
analysis the very elements of contract relations to which Macneil and Macaulay have given most
prominence: culture, politics, and power.
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If you accept this account, if you stop thinking of contract law as a
pathetically inadequate attempt by legal academics to structure the
dealings of the commercial world and think of it instead as a (relatively
modest) platform for the expression of ideology, then its doctrines be-
come interesting again for what they can reveal about the society's offi-
cial values. (Of course, at least as interesting if not more so for the same
purpose, would be less elevated, "field-level" manifestations of legal
ideology, such as advice given in lawyers' offices; but these are obvi-
ously a lot harder to study.) This has been the focus of the fascinating
work of some of the scholars associated with the Conference on Critical
Legal Studies, who have tried to show, working with doctrinal materi-
als alone, how contracts doctrine tries to suppress, deny, or mediate its
own internal contradictions. For example, every time mainstream con-
tracts courts or commentators approach a full recognition of relational-
ist insights (as when relationalism raises reliance-based obligations, or
paternalistically protects the weak from consenting to their victimiza-
tion, or enforces a "socialism-of-the-transaction" by dividing unex-
pected losses by need and ability to pay), they will find some device to
keep the implications of relationalism from threatening their liberal-
individualist core premises. They will use contract interpretation to dis-
guise the relationalist result as the individualist intent of the parties.
They will saturate the reasons for the result in the peculiar facts of the
case at hand. They will classify the relational doctrine as belonging to
an exceptional body of remedies available only in special and unusual
situations. They will rhetorically celebrate the core values of freedom of
contract in dicta while doing freehanded equitable redistribution in the
case before them."
If persuasive, the hypothesis just offered for the discontinuity be-
tween doctrine and law-in-action-that doctrine is ideologically com-
mitted to denying certain relational realities-might also furnish some
28. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 13; Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. Rav. 563 (1982); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 892 (1983); Mensch, Freedom of Contract As Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1981); Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
If I may be allowed a moment of peevishness in what is otherwise meant to be a paean of
praise: I think it unfortunate that Macneil's Symposium paper contributes-while extending the
courtesy of respectful summary of their actual views to every other contracts school he disagrees
with-to what is becoming a legal-academic habit of making slighting references to Critical Legal
Studies work as if it were so absurdly far-out, flaky, obscurely written, and obviously wrong as not
to be worth engaging with. (CLS scholars, by contrast, usually try to take very seriously the views
of their liberal-doctrinal or law-and-economics antagonists, and to restate those views very thor-
oughly-often even more thoroughly than their authors have-before attacking them.) It's espe-
cially unfortunate because, for the reasons laid out in this Comment, I think that Macneil and the
CLS writers share a good many intellectual projects in common, for all their political differences.
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guidelines for a task that both Macneil and I are very interested in:
writing the history of contract relations. If the hypothesis is right, it
would be futile to try to write the history of contract law doctrine as if it
were a functional adaptation by the legal system to the underlying
needs of commercial parties. I share, for example, what I take to be
Macneil's skepticism that most of the changes in contracts doctrine
over the last two centuries can be completely accounted for as func-
tional responses to changing modes of structuring business transac-
tions. The two leading histories of nineteenth century contract law,
Horwitz's and Atiyah's, seem most convincing to me when they treat
doctrinal history as part of the more general history of shifts in ideolog-
ical discourse (e.g., changing ideas of political economy), and least so
when they treat it as a set of practical responses to the desires of
businessmen.29
Indeed, if we are prepared to take to heart the Macneil-Macaulay
discovery of discontinuity between individualist-transactional doctrine
and solidary-hierarchical-relational practice, we should probably dis-
card completely some of the functionalist background assumptions that
have tended to inform our views of the role of law in economic change.
I would speculate that most lawyers and law teachers who think about
the matter at all would tell something like the following story about the
evolution of contracts in recent times. It has been, roughly speaking, a
three-stage evolution.
The first stage is that of mercantilist regulation and community
custom: local hierarchical relations of primary social groups (the
manor, the town, the extended-family household production unit), tem-
pered by equitable norms of community, set the basic terms of eco-
nomic relations. Contract law is the law of the primary group or of the
local jury; there is also supplemental regulation of prices, wages, and
production by mercantilist state policies, monopolies, or guilds.
In the second stage, economic actors win their freedom from status
hierarchies, local customs, and state control to become free exchangers
of land, labor, and capital in a laissez-faire market. Contract law be-
comes the abstract, formal, classical system; anything (within the limits
of public law) can be commodified and its exchange contracted for, on
any terms the parties can extract; and the law will blindly enforce the
exchange.
In the third stage, several things happen simultaneously. First, dis-
crete market transactions between strangers increasingly give way to
continuing relations-within firms, within increasingly specialized
29. M. HORWITZ, TE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); P.
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
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trades, within increasingly solidary associations (trade associations, un-
ions, etc.). Second, regulation increasingly cuts into freedom of con-
tract, to repair "market failures" or to redistribute power and wealth to
increasingly organized and politically potent interest groups. The pri-
vate law of contracts increasingly recognizes both relational realities
and regulatory policies.
Again, if Macneil and Macaulay are right, the far-reaching impli-
cation of their insight is that this entire story is in need of serious revi-
sion. This whole notion that economic dealings started out embedded
in hierarchical organic communities, then got disembedded as individu-
als dug out and formed their own free-floating relations in markets, and
finally got re-embedded in specialized firms, trades and regulatory sys-
tems, is at best a set of very rough and inadequate generalizations. Eco-
nomic relations are always embedded; markets are always structured by
a complex of local, ethnic and trading cultures, and by varying regimes
of non-state and state regulation. Dealing between "strangers" cannot
regularly take place-e.g., one cannot trade on bills of exchange outside
trading communities that recognize bills of exchange. The imagery be-
hind the account of Stage Two in the standard story is supplied not by
any close attention to the structure of economic dealings in nineteenth
century England or America. (Such attention, I agree with Macneil,
would yield a richly "relational" historical sociology--of plantation
slavery, factory organization, networks of planter-factor, farmer-mer-
chant-creditor, entrepreneur-banker, wholesaler-retailer-and nothing
remotely like a world of discrete transactions between strangers.) This
imagery is rather the product of certain conventions of ideological dis-
course, conventions most definitely embodied in contract law among
other places, which encouraged even people who dealt with one another
in socially-embedded solidary and hierarchical continuing contract re-
lations to think of one another as strangers and equals. In short, the law
embodies a set of fantasies about the world that become real when peo-
ple act upon them as if they are real: when, for example, people accept
the terms of a deal imposed upon them by powerful others as the prod-
uct of circumstances and their own volition rather than simply of the
power of others, or when they abandon a lifelong trading or business
partner because the relation is no longer profitable. Freedom of con-
tract means, among other things, never having to say you are sorry.
Some theorists have even advanced a bold hypothesis of a specific
historical causal relationship between the fantasy world of political-le-
gal ideological discourse about contracts and the social world of con-
tracting: they contend that encouraging people to deal with one another
as strangers progressively erodes the underlying relations of solidarity,
reciprocity and trust upon which capitalist economies essentially de-
HeinOnline -- 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 578 1985
Solidarity and Power in Contract Law
pend.3 ° If there is anything at all to this view, it suggests an urgent set of
practical reasons-if reasons are required beyond inherent intellectual
fascination-for lawyers interested in contract law to overcome their
traditional resistance and to open their understandings to the remark-
able, if up until now rather lonely, accomplishments of Macneil and
Macaulay.
30. F. HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMrrs To GROWTH 84-102 (1976); J. ScHuMPnETR, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 121-63 (1942); Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society:
Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 J. ECON. LIUTRATuRE 1463 (1982).
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